Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive which obfuscates the access patterns to a storage thereby preventing privacy leakage via access patterns. So far in the current literature only 'fully functional' ORAMs are widely studied which can protect, at a cost of considerable performance penalty, against the strong adversaries who have access to the memory address bus and can monitor all read and write operations. However, for weaker and more common adversaries who can learn the pattern of write accesses only (not reads), a fully functional ORAM turns out to be an overkill, since only write accesses need to be obfuscated. A simple 'write-only' ORAM is sufficient for such adversaries, and, more interestingly, is preferred as it can offer far more performance and energy efficiency than the fully functional ORAM.
Introduction
User's data privacy concerns in computation outsourcing have gained serious attention over the past couple of decades. To address this challenge, various trusted-hardware based secure processor architectures have been proposed including TPM [1, 29, 36 ], Intel's TPM+TXT [15] , eXecute Only Memory (XOM) [18, 19, 20] , Aegis [34, 35] , Ascend [10] , Phantom [22] and Intel's SGX [23] . A trusted-hardware platform receives user's encrypted data, which is decrypted and computed upon inside the trusted boundary, and finally the encrypted results of the computation are sent to the user. The trustedhardware is assumed to be tamper-resistant, i.e. an adversary cannot probe the processor chip to learn any information.
Although all the data stored outside the secure processor's trusted boundary, e.g. in the main memory, can be encrypted, information can still be leaked to an adversary through the access patterns to the stored data [41] . In order to prevent such leakage, Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a well established technique, first proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [11] . ORAM obfuscates the memory access pattern by introducing several randomized 'redundant' accesses, thereby preventing privacy leakage at a cost of significant performance penalty. Intense research over the last few decades has resulted in more and more efficient and cryptographically-secure ORAM schemes [6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 37, 8, 40, 39] .
A key observation regarding the adversarial model assumed by the current renowned ORAM techniques is that the adversary is capable of learning fine-grained information of all the accesses made to the memory. This includes the information about which location is accessed, the type of operations (read/write), and the time of the access. It is an extremely strong adversarial model which, in most cases, requires direct physical access to the memory address bus in order to monitor both read and write accesses.
A relatively weaker but more feasible and prevalent adversarial model is the one where, instead of each and every access, the adversary only gets to see the snapshots of memory, e.g. via a compromised Direct Memory Access (DMA) [3, 4, 21, 5, 27] . DMA is a standard performance feature which grants full access of the main memory to certain peripheral buses, e.g. FireWire, Thunderbolt etc. Recent work ([33] ) demonstrated that DMA attacks can also be launched remotely by injecting malware to the dedicated hardware devices, such as graphic processors and network interface cards, attached to the host platform.
While such an adversary cannot directly monitor the memory address bus, he can still learn the pattern of write accesses made to the memory by taking frequent memory snapshots. Clearly, any two memory snapshots only differ in the locations where the data has been modified in the latter snapshot. In other words, comparing two snapshots not only reveals the fact that write accesses (if any) have been made to the memory, but it also reveals the exact locations of the accesses. This reveals to an adversary a precise access pattern of memory writes, which could potentially leak private information in certain applications.
Current so-called fully functional ORAM schemes, which obfuscate both read and write access patterns, also offer a solution to such weaker adversaries. However, the added protection (obfuscation of reads) offered by fully functional ORAMs is unnecessary and is practically an overkill in this scenario which results in significant performance penalty. Path ORAM [32] , the most efficient and practical fully functional ORAM system for secure processors so far, still incurs about 2 − 10× performance degradation [10, 28] over an insecure DRAM system.
A far more efficient solution to this problem could be a write-only ORAM scheme, which only obfuscates the write accesses made to the memory. Since read accesses leave no trace in the memory snapshot, therefore an adversary cannot learn anything about the read access patterns. Hence read accesses do not need to be obfuscated, which allows a writeonly ORAM to have significant performance advantage over a fully functional ORAM.
A recent work, HIVE [2] , has proposed an efficient writeonly ORAM scheme for implementing hidden volumes in hard disk drives. The key idea is similar to Path ORAM, i.e., each data block is written to a new random location, along with some dummy blocks, every time it is accessed. However, a fundamental challenge that arises in this simple scheme is to determine whether a randomly chosen physical location contains real or dummy data, in order to avoid overwriting the existing useful data block. HIVE proposes an inverse position map that associates each physical location to a logical address. Before each write to a physical location s, first the logical address a linked to s is looked up via the inverse position map; then the regular position map is looked up to find out the physical location s linked to the logical address a. If s = s then the two mappings are consistent which shows that s contains a real data block, otherwise it contains an outdated/dummy data block. The inverse position map approach, however, turns out to be a storage and performance bottleneck because of the size of inverse position map and dual lookups (s → a, and a → s ).
To address this challenge, we propose a simplified writeonly ORAM scheme called Flat ORAM 1 . Instead of using inverse position map, Flat ORAM introduces a new data structure called Occupancy Map (OccMap) which contains the availability information (occupied/vacant) of every physical location in a highly compressed form. For typical parameter settings, OccMap is about 25× compact compared to the inverse position map structure. This dense structure allows the OccMap blocks to exploit about a few orders of magnitude higher locality, resulting in considerable performance gain.
In particular, the paper makes the following contributions: 1. We study an existing state-of-the-art write-only ORAM scheme, HIVE, in the context of secure processor architectures, and demonstrate its performance bottlenecks. 1 Flat ORAM replaces the binary tree structure of Path ORAM with a flat array of data blocks; hence termed as 'Flat' ORAM.
2. A novel write-only ORAM scheme, called Flat ORAM, for secure processors is proposed. The micro-architecture of the scheme is discussed in detail and the design space is comprehensively explored. 3. Our simulation results show that Flat ORAM offers upto 50% performance gain on average over HIVE, and only incurs slowdowns of 2.9× and 1.5× over the insecure DRAM for memory bound Splash2 and SPEC06 benchmarks respectively. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our adversarial model in detail. Section 3 provides the necessary background of fully functional ORAMs. Section 4 discusses write-only ORAMs in general, and a previously proposed write-only ORAM scheme called HIVE in particular. The proposed Flat ORAM scheme is introduced in Section 5, and its detailed construction and security analysis is presented in Section 6. Section 7 evaluates the the performance of the proposed scheme, and we conclude the paper in Section 8.
Adversarial Model
We assume a relaxed form of the adversarial model considered in several prior works related to fully functional oblivious RAMs in secure processor settings [28, 39, 8] .
In our model, a user's computation job is outsourced to a cloud, where a trusted processor performs the computation on user's private data. The user's private data is stored (in encrypted form) in the untrusted memory external to the trusted processor, i.e. DRAM. In order to compute on user's private data, the trusted processor interacts with DRAM. In particular, the processor's last level cache (LLC) misses result in reading the data from DRAM, and the evictions from the LLC result in writing the data to DRAM. The cloud service itself is not treated as an adversary, i.e. it does not try to infer any information from the memory access patterns of the user's program. However, since the cloud serves several users at the same time, sharing of critical resources such as DRAM among various applications from different users is inevitable. Among these users being served by the cloud service, we assume a malicious user who is able to monitor (and potentially learn the secret information from) the data write sequences of other users' applications to the DRAM by taking frequent snapshots of the DRAM, e.g. via a compromised DMA. Moreover, he may also tamper with the DRAM contents or play replay attacks in order to manipulate other users' applications and/or learn more about their secret data.
To protect the system from such an adversary, we add to the processor chip a Write-Only ORAM controller: an additional trusted hardware module. Now all the off-chip traffic goes to DRAM through the ORAM controller. In order to formally define the security definitions that are satisfied by our ORAM controller, we adapt the write-only ORAM privacy definition from HIVE [2] 
In other words, memory snapshots only reveal to the adversary the number of write accesses made to the memory instead of their precise access pattern, whereas no trace of any read accesses made to the memory is revealed to the adversary. In the rest of this paper, we only consider the obfuscation of write accesses and refer to these simply as the 'accesses', since the read accesses do not need to be obfuscated in our model.
In order to detect malicious tampering of the memory by the adversary, we follow the standard definition of data integrity and freshness [8] :
Definition 2 (Write-Only ORAM Integrity) From the processor's perspective, the ORAM behaves like a valid memory with overwhelming probability, and detects any violation to data authenticity and/or freshness.
Following the prior works [22] [8] , (a) we assume that the order and/or timing of the individual DRAM accesses made during an ORAM access does not reveal any information; (b) we do not protect the leakage over ORAM timing channel. In particular, the time when an ORAM access is made or the application program's termination time is not obfuscated. The problem of leakage over ORAM timing channel has been addressed in the existing literature [9] and can easily be applied to the current scheme.
Background

Oblivious RAM
A fully functional Oblivious RAM ( [11] ), or more commonly known as ORAM, is a primitive that obfuscates the user's (i.e. Processor's) access patterns to a storage (i.e. DRAM) such that by monitoring the memory access patterns, an adversary is not able to learn anything about the data being accessed. The ORAM interface transforms the user's access sequence of program addresses ← − a = (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a n ) into a sequence of ORAM accesses to physical addresses ← − r = (r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r m ) to produce the required data. Since the physical locations being accessed are revealed to the adversary, the ORAM interface guarantees that the physical access pattern ( ← − r ) is independent of the logical access pattern ( ← − a ), hence user's potentially data dependent access patterns are not revealed. Furthermore, data stored in ORAMs should be encrypted using probabilistic encryption to conceal the data content as well as the fact whether or not the content has been updated. With ORAM, an adversary should not be able to tell (a) whether a given ORAM access is a read or write, (b) which logical address in ORAM is accessed, or (c) what data is read from/written to that location.
Path ORAM
Path ORAM [32] is currently the most efficient and well suited ORAM implementation for secure processors. It has two main hardware components: the binary tree storage and the ORAM controller (cf. Figure 1) . Binary tree stores the data content of the ORAM and is implemented on DRAM. Each node in the tree can hold up to Z useful data blocks, and any empty slots are filled with dummy blocks. All blocks, real or dummy, are probabilistically encrypted and cannot be distinguished. The path from the root node to the leaf s is defined as path s. ORAM controller is a piece of trusted hardware that controls the tree structure. Besides necessary logic circuits, the ORAM controller contains two main structures, a position map and a stash. The position map is a lookup table that associates the program address a of a data block with a path in the ORAM tree (path s). The stash is a buffer that stores up to a small number of data blocks at a time. Each data block a in Path ORAM is mapped (randomly) to some path s via the position map, i.e. at any time, the data block a must be stored either on path s, or in the stash. (see Figure 1 ). Path ORAM follows the following steps when a request on block a is issued by the processor. 1. Look up the position map with the block's program address a, yielding the corresponding leaf label s. 2. Read all the nodes on path s. Decrypt all blocks within the ORAM controller and add them to the stash if they are real (i.e., not dummy) blocks. 3. Return block a to the secure processor. 4. Assign a new random leaf s to a (update the position map). 5. Encrypt and evict as many blocks as possible from the stash to path s. Fill any remaining space on path s with encrypted dummy blocks.
Step 4 guarantees that a random path will be accessed when block a is accessed later and this path is independent of any previously accessed random paths (unlinkability). As a result, each ORAM access is random and unlinkable regardless of the request pattern.
Recursive Path ORAM
In practice, the position map is usually too large to be stored in the trusted processor. Recursive ORAM has been proposed to solve this problem [30] . In a 2-level recursive Path ORAM, for instance, the original position map is stored in a second ORAM, and the second ORAM's position map is stored in the trusted processor. This recursion is continued until the final position map size can fit on-chip. Unified ORAM [8] scheme reduces the performance penalty of recursion by caching position map ORAM blocks to exploit locality (similar to the TLB exploiting locality in page tables). To hide whether a position map access hits or misses in the cache, Unified ORAM stores both data and position map blocks in the same binary tree.
Path ORAM Overheads
Path ORAM incurs significant energy and performance penalties compared to insecure DRAM. Under typical settings for secure processors (gigabytes of memory and 64-to 128-byte blocks), Path ORAM has a 20-30 level binary tree where each node typically stores 3 or 4 data blocks [31, 28] . This means that each ORAM access reads and writes 60-120 blocks, in contrast to a single read or write operation in an insecure storage system.
Write-Only ORAMs
In contrast to the well known fully functional ORAMs, a write-only ORAM scheme only obfuscates the patterns of write accesses made to a storage. Write-only ORAM is preferred for performance reasons over fully functional ORAMs in situations where the adversary is not able to monitor the data read access patterns.
There has been very limited research work done so far to explore write-only ORAMs, and to best of our knowledge, write-only ORAMs for secure processors have not been explored at all. Li and Datta [17] present a write-only ORAM scheme to be used with Private Information Retrieval (PIR) in order to preserve the privacy of data outsourced to a data center. Although this scheme achieves an amortized write cost of O(B log N), it incurs a read cost of O(B.N) for a storage of N blocks each of size B. For efficient reads, it requires the client side storage (i.e. the on-chip position map) to be polynomial in N. In a secure processor setting, DRAM reads are usually the major performance bottleneck, and introducing a complexity polynomial in N on this critical path is highly unwanted. Furthermore, the on-chip storage is also highly constrained. Therefore this scheme does not suit our needs.
A recent work, HIVE [2] , has proposed a write-only ORAM scheme for hidden volumes in hard disk drives. Although the HIVE write-only ORAM presented-as-is ( [2] ) targets a totally different application, we believe that its parameter settings can be tweaked to be used in the secure processor setting. In this paper, we consider HIVE implemented in the secure processor setting as the baseline write-only ORAM scheme to be compared with our proposed write-only ORAM.
Avoiding Redundant Memory Accesses
The fact that the adversary cannot see read accesses allows a write-only ORAM to avoid almost all the redundancy incurred by fully functional ORAMs. In Path ORAM, for example, the purpose of accessing a whole path instead of just one block upon each read and write access is to prevent linkability between a write and a following read access to the same logical block.
In order to elaborate this, let's consider an example of a simple DRAM storage with a randomized secret mapping of each logical address to a random physical address. Assume that the adversary can monitor both read and write accesses. Upon a read request to logical address a, it is simply read from its corresponding random physical location s. When this block gets evicted from the processor's last level cache (LLC), it is written to a new random location s . So far no information about logical block a is revealed to the adversary. However, if a is read again, the physical location s will be accessed again. This allows the adversary to learn that the same logical block a is accessed twice: first read and then written, i.e. he can link the two accesses which could leak further information. In Path ORAM, on the other hand, the binary tree structure and the redundancy of accessing a whole path for each access allows the block a to be written to its 'new' path s without the path s being explicitly accessed. It is possible because every two sibling leafs s and s in the binary tree share a common sub-path from their parent to the root node, and therefore the data block mapped to path s can reside anywhere on the subpath shared with s . Hence, when block a is requested again, the adversary sees path s being accessed for the first time in the recent history of accesses with overwhelming probability. Consequently, he is unable to link the two accesses.
For write-only ORAMs, however, since the adversary cannot see the read accesses at all, therefore the linkability problem would never arise as long as each data block is written to a new random location every time it is accessed. Although HIVE [2] proposes a k-factor redundancy upon each data write, we argue that its is unnecessary for the desired security as explained above, and can be avoided to gain performance.
Problem of Collisions
An immediate consequence of avoiding Path ORAM's redundancy to design an efficient write-only ORAM is the problem of collisions. A collision refers to a scenario when a physical location s, which is randomly chosen to write a logical block a, already contains useful data which cannot be overwritten. It is a major challenge to efficiently detect and avoid a potential collision.
Since a read access must not leave its trace in the memory in order to avoid the linkability problem, a naive approach of marking the physical location as 'vacant' by writing 'dummy' data to it upon each read is not possible.
To address this problem, HIVE [2] proposes an inverse position map structure that maps each physical location to a logical address. Before each write operation to a physical location s, a potential collision check is performed which involves two steps. First the logical address a linked to s is looked up via the inverse position map. Then the regular position map is looked up to find out the most recent physical location s linked to the logical address a. If s = s then since the two mappings are synchronized, it shows that s contains useful data, hence a collision has occurred. Otherwise, if s = s then this means that the entry for s in the inverse position map is outdated, and block a has now moved to a new location s . Therefore, the current location can be overwritten, hence no collision. However, we demonstrate in our evaluations that the inverse position map approach introduces performance and storage overheads. For a system with a block size of B bytes and total N logical blocks, inverse position map requires log N additional bits space for each physical block. Crucially, this large size of a single inverse position map entry restricts the total number of entries per block to a small constant, which leads to less locality within a block. This results in performance degradation.
Flat ORAM Scheme
In this section, we present our proposed write-only ORAM in detail. First, the core algorithm of Flat ORAM is explained, then we discuss its architectural details and various optimizations for a practical implementation in a secure processor.
Fundamental Data Structures
Flat ORAM maintains two fundamental data structures; (a) Position Map and (b) Occupancy Map. 5.1.1. Position Map (PosMap): It is a standard Path ORAM structure that maintains randomized mappings of logical blocks to physical locations. However there is one subtle difference between PosMap of Path ORAM and Flat ORAM. In Path ORAM, PosMap stores a path number for each logical block and the block can reside anywhere on that path. In contrast, PosMap in Flat ORAM stores the exact physical address where a logical block is stored.
Occupancy Map (OccMap):
OccMap is a newly introduced structure in Flat ORAM. It is essentially a large bit-mask where each bit corresponds to a physical location. The binary value of each bit represents whether the corresponding physical block contains real or outdated/dummy data. OccMap is of crucial importance to avoid collisions (cf. Section 4.2), and hence for the correctness of Flat ORAM. 5.1.3. Stash: Stash, also adapted from Path ORAM, is a small buffer in the trusted memory to temporarily hold data blocks evicted from the processor's last level cache (LLC). A slight but crucial modification, however, is that Flat ORAM only buffers dirty 2 data blocks in the stash; while clean blocks 2 Blocks with modified data. PosMap := {⊥} N Uninitialized Position Map.
3:
OccMap := {0} P Uninitialized Occupancy Map.
4:
for j ∈ {1, · · · , N} do 5:
r ← UNIFORMRAND(1, · · · , P) end for 14: end procedure evicted from the LLC are simply discarded. This slight modification turns out to be significantly beneficial for performance.
Basic Algorithm
Let N be the total number of logical data blocks that we want to securely store in our ORAM, which is implemented on top of a DRAM; and let each data block be of size B bytes. Let P be the number of physical blocks that our DRAM can physically store, i.e. the DRAM capacity (where P ≥ N).
Initial Setup: Algorithm 1 shows the setup phase of our system. Two null-initialized arrays PosMap and OccMap, corresponding to position and occupancy map of size N and P entries respectively, are allocated. For now, we assume that both PosMap and OccMap reside on-chip in the trusted memory to which the adversary has no access. However, since these arrays can be quite large and the trusted memory is quite constrained, we later on show how this problem is solved. Initially, since all physical blocks are empty, each OccMap entry is set to 0. Now, each logical block is mapped to a uniformly random physical block, i.e. PosMap is initialized, while avoiding any collisions using OccMap. OccMap is updated along the way in order to mark those physical locations which have been mapped to a logical block as 'occupied'. Notice that in order to minimize the probability of collision, P should be sufficiently larger than N, e.g. P ≈ 2N gives a 50% collision probability.
The procedures to read/write a data block corresponding to the virtual address a from/to the ORAM are shown in algorithm 2.
Reads: A read operation is straightforward as it does not need to be obfuscated. Essentially the PosMap entry for the logical block a is looked up, and the encrypted data is read through normal DRAM read. The data is decrypted and returned to the LLC along with its current physical position s. The location s is stored in the tag array of the LLC, and proves to be useful upon eviction of the data from the LLC.
Writes: Since write operations should be non-blocking in a secure processor setting, the ORAM writes are performed end loop 14: end procedure in two steps. Whenever a data block is evicted from the LLC, it is first simply added to the stash queue, without incurring any latency. While the processor moves on to computing on other data in its registers/caches, the ORAM controller then works in the background to evict the block from stash to the DRAM. A block a to be written is picked from the stash, and a new uniformly random physical position s new is chosen for this block. The OccMap is looked up to determine whether the location s new is vacant. If so, the write operation proceeds by simply recording the new position s new for block a in PosMap, updating the OccMap entries for s new and s old accordingly, and finally writing encrypted data at location s new . Otherwise if the location s new is already occupied by some useful data block, the probability of which is N/P, a new random position is chosen for the block a and this process is repeated until a vacant location is found. We assume that the encryption/decryption algorithms Enc K /Dec K implement probabilistic encryption, e.g. AES counter mode, as done in prior works [28, 8] . Notice that storing s old along with the data upon reads will save extra ORAM accesses to lookup s old from the recursive PosMap (cf. Section 6.1).
Security
Privacy: The basic algorithm of Flat ORAM presented above guarantees that a sequence of write accesses generated by the processor is translated into uniformly random accesses to the physical memory, thereby providing the desired privacy property of our write-only ORAM (cf. Definition 1).
Integrity: Next, we move on to making this basic ORAM practical for a real system. Essentially, the main challenge is to get rid of the huge on-chip memory requirements imposed by PosMap and OccMap. While addressing this challenge, we discuss an efficient technique for memory integrity verification called PMMAC [8] which satisfies the integrity definition (cf. Definition 2).
Stash Management: Another critical missing piece is to prevent the unlikely event of stash overflow for a small constant sized stash, as such an event could break the privacy guarantees offered by Flat ORAM. We completely eliminate the possibility of a stash overflow event by using a proven technique called Background Eviction [28] . We present a detailed discussion around stash size and Background Eviction technique in Section 6.5.
Detailed Architecture
In this section, we discuss architectural details of Flat ORAM. An additional hardware module called 'ORAM controller' is added to the chip, which implements the Flat ORAM algorithm. All the communication between the processor and the DRAM is channeled through the ORAM controller. We implement the following optimizations to reduce the on-chip storage, hardware and performance overheads.
Recursive Position Map
In order to squeeze the on-chip PosMap size, a standard recursive construction of position map [30, 8] is used (cf. Section 3.3). In a 2-level recursive position map, for instance, the original PosMap structure is stored in another set of data blocks which we call a hierarchy of position map, and the PosMap of the first hierarchy is stored in the trusted memory on-chip (Figure 2) . The above trick can be repeated, i.e., adding more hierarchies of position map to further reduce the final position map size at the expense of increased latency. Notice that all the position map hierarchies (except for the final position map) are stored in the untrusted DRAM along with the actual data blocks, and can be treated as regular data blocks; this technique is called Unified ORAM [8] . The recursive position map has a similar organization as OS page tables.
Managing the Occupancy Map
The OccMap array bits are first sliced into chunks equal to the ORAM block size (B bytes). We call these chunks OccMap Blocks. Notice that each OccMap block contains occupancy information of 8B physical locations. Now the challenge is to efficiently store these blocks somewhere off-chip. A straightforward approach would be to encrypt OccMap blocks under probabilistic encryption, and store them contiguously in a dedi- Map   D0  D1  D2  D3  D4  D5  D6  D7  O0  O1  O2  O3   P0  P1  P2  P3   P6  P7  P8   P4 cated fixed area in DRAM, as proposed by HIVE [2] . However in Flat ORAM, this approach would lead to a serious security flaw which is explained as follows.
On-Chip
Since the OccMap blocks are stored contiguously at a fixed location in DRAM, an adversary can easily identify the corresponding OccMap block for a given a physical address; and for a given OccMap block, he can identify the contiguous range of corresponding 8B physical locations. With that in mind, when a data block a (previously read from s old ) is evicted from the stash and written to location s new (cf. Algorithm 2), the old OccMap entry is marked as 'vacant' and the new OccMap entry is maked as 'occupied'; i.e. two OccMap blocks O old and O new are updated. Furthermore, the s new location, which falls in the contiguous range covered by one of the two updated OccMap blocks, is also updated with the actual data -thereby revealing the identity of O new . This reveals to the adversary that a logical data block was previously read from some location within the small contiguous range covered by O old , and it is now written to location s new (i.e. coarse grained linkability). Recording several such instances of read-write access pairs and linking them together in a chain reveals the precise pattern of movement of logical block a across the whole memory.
To avoid this problem, we treat the OccMap blocks as regular data blocks, i.e., OccMap blocks are also randomly distributed throughout the whole DRAM, and tracked by the regular PosMap. Figure 2 shows the logical organization of data, PosMap and OccMap blocks. The OccMap blocks are added as 'additional' data blocks at the data hierarchy (Hierarchy 0). Then the recursive position map hierarchies are constructed on top of the complete data set (data blocks and OccMap blocks). Every time an OccMap block is updated, it is mapped to a new random location and hence avoids the linkability problem. We realize that this approach results in overall more position map blocks, however for practical parameters settings (e.g. 128B block size, 8GB DRAM, 4GB working set), it does not result in an additional PosMap hierarchy. Therefore the recursive position map lookup latency is unaffected.
PLB: Caching the PosMap and OccMap Blocks
Position map Lookaside Buffer (PLB) is a useful structure in modern ORAMs [8] . It is used to cache the PosMap blocks, as each PosMap block contains information about several data blocks contiguous in the virtual address space. Figure 2 , the OccMap blocks form a narrow subtree in the logical organization of recursive position map (blocks O0, · · · , O3 and P4, P5, P8 in Figure 2 ). For realistic parameters, e.g. 128 bytes block size, 8GB DRAM, 4GB working set, the ratio of data to OccMap blocks is 1024 to 1. I.e., 1 OccMap block (leaf) for every 1024 data blocks (leafs). This ratio is termed as OccMap scaling factor. For the same parameters, the scaling factor of inverse position map approach used by HIVE [2] is just about 40. The dense structure of Flat ORAM's OccMap blocks provides an opportunity to exploit spatial locality within a block. In other words, for a large scaling factor it is more likely that two randomly chosen physical locations will be covered by the same OccMap block, as compared to a small scaling factor. Furthermore, since two OccMap blocks and their corresponding PosMap blocks are accessed for each write access, a high degree of spatial and temporal locality is exhibited across the blocks in the subtree. In order to also benefit from the locality in OccMap subtree, we cache the OccMap blocks as well in PLB.
Locality in OccMap Blocks: As showin in
Dirty vs. Clean Evictions from LLC & PLB
An eviction of a block from the LLC where the data content of the block has not been modified is called a clean eviction, whereas an eviction where the data has been modified is called dirty eviction. In Path ORAM, since all the read operations also need to be obfuscated, therefore following a read operation, when a block gets evicted from the LLC, it must be re-written to a new random location even if its data is unmodified, i.e. a clean eviction. This is crucial for Path ORAM's security as it guarantees that successive reads to the same logical block result in random paths being accessed. This notion is termed as read-erase, which assumes that the data will be erased from the memory once it is read.
In write-only ORAMs, however, since the read access patterns are not revealed therefore the notion of read-erase is not necessary. A data block can be read from the same location as often as needed as long as it's contents are not modified. This relaxation results in huge performance gain in Flat ORAM. Essentially, upon a clean eviction from the LLC, the block can simply be discarded since one useful copy of the data is still stored in the DRAM. Same reasoning applies to the clean evictions from the PLB. Only the dirty evictions are added to the stash to be written back at a random location in the memory.
Background Eviction: Preventing Stash Overflow
Stash (cf. Section 5.1.3) is a small buffer to temporarily hold the dirty data blocks evicted from the LLC/PLB. If at any time, the rate of blocks being added to the stash becomes higher than the rate of evictions from the stash, the blocks may accumulate in stash causing a stash overflow. Background eviction [28] is a proven and secure technique proposed for Path ORAM to prevent stash overflow. The key idea of background evictions is to temporarily stop serving the real requests (which increase stash occupancy) and issue background evictions or so-called dummy accesses (which decrease stash occupancy) when the stash is full.
We adapt the background eviction technique to eliminate the possibility of a stash overflow event. Notice that whenever an LLC miss occurs and the corresponding block is read and stored in the LLC, it replaces and evicts an existing block from the LLC. This evicted block generates a write request from the LLC to the ORAM controller, and if dirty, this block is added to the stash. This means that by temporarily suspending the read requests issued by the LLC during background evictions, we can prevent the stash occupancy to increase further. With that said, now the ORAM controller simply chooses random locations and, if vacant, evicts the blocks from the stash until the stash occupancy is reduced to a safe threshold. The probability of a successful eviction in each attempt is determined by the DRAM utilization parameter, i.e. the ratio of occupied blocks to the total blocks in DRAM. In our experiments, we choose a utilization of ≈ 1/2, therefore each eviction attempt has ≈ 50% probability of success. Note that background evictions essentially push the problem of stash overflow to the program's termination channel. Configuring the DRAM utilization to be less than 1 guarantees the termination, and we demonstrate good performance for a utilization of 1/2 in Section 7. However, protecting any leakage through the program's termination time is out of scope of this paper.
PLB and Stash Size
Each dirty eviction requires not only the corresponding data block to be updated but also the two related OccMAP blocks which store the new and old occupancy information. In order to relocate these blocks to new random positions, the 'd' hierarchies of corresponding PosMAP blocks will need to be updated and this in turn implies updating their related OccMAP blocks, and so on. If not prevented, this avalanche effect will repeatedly fill the stash implying background evictions which stop serving real requests and increase the termination time. For a large enough PLB with respect to a benchmark's locality, most of the required OccMAP blocks during the benchmark's execution will be in the PLB. This prevents the avalanche effect most of the time (as our evaluation shows) since the OccMAP blocks in PLB can be directly updated.
Even if all necessary OccMAP blocks are in PLB, a dirty eviction still requires the data block with its d PosMAP blocks to be updated. Each of these d + 1 blocks is successfully evicted from the stash with probability 1/2, determined by the DRAM utilization, on each attempt. The probability that exactly m attempts are needed to evict all d + 1 blocks is equal to m−1 d /2 m . This probability becomes very small for m equal to a small constant c times d log d. If the dirty eviction rate (per DRAM access) is at most 1/c, then the stash size will mostly be contained to a small size (e.g., 100 blocks for d = 4) so that additional background eviction which stops serving real requests is not needed (as our evaluation shows).
Notice that the presented write-only ORAM is not asymptotically efficient: In order to show at most a constant factor increase in termination time with overwhelming probability, a proper argument needs to show a small probability of requiring background eviction which halts normal execution. An argument based on M/D/1 queuing theory or 1-D random walks needs the OccMap to be always within the PLB and this means that the effective stash size as compared to Path ORAM's stash definition includes this PLB which scales linearly with N and is not O(logN).
Compressed Position Map
The recursive position map (cf. Section 6.1) for a total of N logical data blocks creates log b (N) hierarchies of position map. Here b represents the number of positions stored in one PosMap block, and is called PosMap scale factor. A higher value of PosMap scale factor would result in less number of PosMap hierarchies and hence yield better performance.
To achieve this goal, Compressed Position Map [8] has been proposed, which results in less PosMap hierarchies than uncompressed PosMap. The basic idea is to store a monotonically increasing counter in the PosMap entry for each logical data block. This counter along with the block's logical address is used as a 'seed' to a keyed pseudo-random function in order to compute a random position for the block. Every time a block is to be written, its PosMap counter is first incremented by one so that a new random position is generated by the pseudo-random function for the block. Notice that even if an adversary knows the PosMap counter value of a block, he is unable to produce the correct location of the block because the ORAM's pseudo-random function uses a secret key. To compress these counters to a feasible size, [8] presents an optimization using a big group counter and several small individual counters per PosMap block. We refer the readers who might be interested in more details to the above citation.
We adapt the compressed PosMap technique in Flat ORAM. One key modification is that the counter for any block to be evicted is incremented even upon unsuccessful eviction attempts, i.e. even if a collision is detected. It is important because otherwise the pseudo-random function will generate the same random location over and over which is already occupied, and hence the block will never be evicted.
Efficient Integrity Verification (PMMAC)
Flat ORAM also implements an efficient memory integrity verification technique termed as PosMap MAC (PMMAC), which is also introduced in [8] along with the compressed position map technique. PMMAC essentially leverages the per-block counters of compressed PosMap to build an efficient technique to perform MAC 3 checks on the data upon reads. Suppose a logical block a has a counter c, then upon writes, the ORAM controller computes a MAC h = MAC K (a || c || data) using the secret key K and writes the tuple (h, data) to the DRAM. Upon reads, the potentially tampered data tuple (h * , data * ) is read. The ORAM controller recomputes h = MAC K (a || c || data * ) and checks whether h = h * . If so, the data integrity is verified. Also, since the counter is incremented upon every write, the freshness of the data is also verified, i.e. integrity check guarantees that the most recently written data has been read.
Experimental Evaluation
Methodology
We use Graphite [24] to model different ORAM schemes in all our experiments. Graphite simulates a tiled multi-core chip. The hardware configurations are listed in Table 1 . We assume there is only one memory controller on the chip, and all ORAM accesses are serialized. The DRAM in Graphite is simply modeled by a flat latency. The 16 GB/s is calculated assuming a 1 GHz chip with 128 pins and pins are the bottleneck of the data transfer.
We use Splash-2 [38] and SPEC06 [16] workloads to evaluate our Flat ORAM scheme (flat_oram) against various baselines. Three baseline designs are used for comparison: the insecure baseline using normal DRAM (dram), the state of the art Path ORAM with dynamic prefetching [39] (path_oram) and the write-only ORAM scheme from HIVE (hive). For all ORAM schemes, we enable the PLB, the compressed position map and integrity verification. The default parameters for ORAM schemes are shown in Table 1 . Unless otherwise stated, all the experiments use these ORAM parameters.
We first show the overall performance comparison of different ORAM schemes for complete Splash2 and SPEC06 benchmark suites (Section 7.2). Then we explore different system parameters in the sensitivity study section (Section 7.3). 
Performance Comparison
Although all ORAM schemes incur performance slowdown over DRAM, however it is important to note that this slowdown is proportional to the memory intensiveness of the application. Memory bound applications suffer from higher performance degradation than compute bound applications. Figure 3a and Figure 3b show normalized completion times (shown by solid bars) of Splash2 and SPEC06 benchmarks with respect to DRAM. The benchmarks are sorted in ascending order of slowdowns over DRAM from left to right. We consider all the benchmarks with less than 2× overhead as Computation Intensive benchmarks (plotted over green background) and all those with more than 2× overhead as Memory Intensive benchmarks (plotted over red background). Clearly, Path ORAM incurs the highest overhead among all three ORAM schemes because it is a fully functional ORAM which also obfuscates the read accesses. On average, it incurs about 8.6× slowdown for Splash2 and 5.3× for SPEC06 memory intensive benchmarks (mem_avg).
HIVE also shows significant performance degradation compared to Flat ORAM for memory intensive benchmarks (ocean_contiguous, ocean_non_contiguous, mcf). The average slowdown of HIVE for memory bound Splash2 and SPEC06 workloads is 4.5× and 2× respectively. Whereas Flat ORAM outperforms HIVE by up to 50% performance gain, having respective average slowdowns of 2.9× and 1.5×.
This performance gap between HIVE and Flat ORAM is primarily because the inverse position map approach of HIVE results in significantly increased number of additional DRAM accesses. Figure 3a and Figure 3b also show normalized total number of DRAM accesses w.r.t. insecure DRAM system (shown by red markers) for HIVE and Flat ORAM. These numbers include both the DRAM accesses issued to serve regular ORAM requests and also the ones caused by background evictions (cf. Section 6.5). The normalized access count for Path ORAM is around 200 on average, and is not shown on the plot. It can be seen that HIVE issues 6.4 and 3.4 DRAM accesses, whereas Flat ORAM issues 4.3 and 2.0 accesses on average for each request issued by the processor for memory intensive Splash2 and SPEC06 workloads respectively. The large size of inverse position map blocks degrades the spatial locality among these blocks. Whereas the OccMap blocks exhibit significant locality because of their dense structure (cf. Section 6.3). As a consequence, more PLB evictions happen in HIVE compared to Flat ORAM which directly affects the performance. This normalized number of DRAM accesses is proportional to the energy consumption of the memory subsystem. I.e., a higher number of DRAM accesses would result in more energy consumption. On average, the Flat ORAM scheme saves between 45% to 65% energy over HIVE for various workloads.
Sensitivity Study
In this section, we will study how different parameters in the system affect the performance of write-only ORAM schemes. 7.3.1. DRAM Utilization When a block needs to be written to the DRAM, a random position is chosen and if that location is vacant, the block is written at that location (cf. Section 5.2). The probability that a randomly chosen location is 'vacant' is determined by the DRAM utilization, i.e. the ratio of occupied blocks to total blocks in DRAM.
In order to study the effect of DRAM utilization, we show the results of various physical DRAM sizes (8, 16 , 32GB) for a constant working set of 4GB in Figure 4 . The resulting DRAM utilizations are 50%, 25% and 12.5% respectively.
Going from 50% to 25% utilization, memory intensive benchmarks (ocean_contiguous, ocean_non_contiguous) gain significant performance, as the collisions during write operations are reduced by half. However, the jump from 25% to 12.5% utilization does not yield much gain because the collision probability of 25% at 16GB mark is already too low to be a major performance bottleneck. Since less memory intensive benchmarks (gobmk, sjeng) are not constrained by write operations anyway, lower utilizations do not help much. 7.3.2. Stash Size As discussed in Section 6.5, when the stash occupancy increases than a particular threshold, the ORAM starts performing 'background evictions'. Since background evictions cause the real requests to be suspended temporarily, frequent background evictions cause performance degradation. A larger stash is less likely to become full and thus reduces background eviction rate and improves performance. In Figure 5 , the stash size is swept for two different benchmarks, one is highly memory intensive (ocean_non_contiguous) and the other one is significantly less memory bound (gobmk). The memory intensive benchmark benefits from a large stash, as it experiences high background evictions rate at lower stash sizes. Increasing the stash size reduces the background evictions rate resulting in better performance. The less memory intensive benchmark does not benefit much from increased stash sizes, as it already has a low background evictions rate.
In general, Flat ORAM shows significant performance gain over HIVE even at small stash sizes. 7.3.3. Cacheline Size We use the default cacheline size of 128 Bytes, in order to match the parameters in prior works ( [28, 8, 39] ). Figure 6 shows the performance of HIVE and Flat ORAM for three different cacheline sizes (64, 128 and 256 Bytes). Having a larger cacheline size allows larger PosMap scale factors which results in overall less PosMap hierarchies (cf. Section 6.7). Additionally, memory intensive benchmarks benefit from large block sizes by exploiting data locality with blocks. This observation is depicted in our results.
DRAM Latency & Bandwidth
In Path ORAM, each ORAM access results in about 200 DRAM accesses on average under typical parameter settings. Most of these accesses can be issued in a burst without waiting for the first data block to arrive, since the addresses are known a priori, e.g. accessing a full path. Therefore, the DRAM bandwidth becomes the main bottleneck in Path ORAM, whereas the DRAM latency plays less significant role as it is incurred less often.
However, the write-only ORAMs under consideration only issue less than 10 DRAM accesses per ORAM access (cf. Section 7.2). Furthermore, there could be interdependencies within these 10 accesses, e.g., reading an OccMap block to find out if a position is vacant, and then issuing further writes in case a vacant position is found. In such cases, DRAM latency is incurred more often and hence plays more prominent role in the overall performance than the DRAM bandwidth.
This phenomenon is shown in DRAM latency and bandwidth sweep studies in Figure 7 and Figure 8 respectively. Memory intensive benchmarks (ocean_contiguous) are more sensitive to DRAM latency and experience more performance degradation at higher latencies. On the other hand, compute bound benchmarks (sjeng) are less sensitive to the DRAM latency. Increasing the DRAM bandwidth seems to help only a tiny bit as expected and explained in the discussion above.
Conclusion
We propose an efficient and practical write-only Oblivious RAM scheme called Flat ORAM for secure processor architectures. It is the first write-only ORAM with a concrete implementation in secure processors domain. On memory intensive Splash-2 and SPEC06 benchmarks, Flat ORAM only incurs on average 2.9× and 1.5× slowdown respectively. Compared to a closest related work in the literature, Flat ORAM offers up to 50% higher performance and between 45% and 60% energy savings.
